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 COMMENTARY
 THE MAKING OF THE LEGAL PROCESS
 William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
 Philip P. Frickey**
 In one of the most unusual decisions in the history of legal pub-
 lishing, Foundation Press is printing the I958 "tentative edition" of
 Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks's teaching materials on The
 Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law. 1
 Although The Legal Process remains unfinished to this day, it provided
 the agenda, much of the analytic structure, and even the name of the
 "legal process school" of the I950S and the ig6os.2 One need not
 embrace the proposition that The Legal Process is "the most influential
 book not produced in movable type since Gutenberg"3 to agree that
 these are unusually important teaching materials whose influence ex-
 tends well beyond the students who studied them in a law school
 course.
 Despite their fame, The Legal Process materials presented us (the
 current editors) with several mysteries: How original were they? Why
 were the materials never published in the authors' lifetimes? How
 did these unpublished materials gain the stature they enjoy today?
 This Commentary provides both background and our own informed
 speculation about the answers to these questions. We maintain that
 The Legal Process was a splendid synthesis of public law themes that
 had become prominent before World War II. Although the world
 view and assumptions of the materials were sharply questioned by the
 next generation, The Legal Process and its philosophy made a come-
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
 ** Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
 We thank Clark Byse, Abram Chayes, Norman Dorsen, Erwin Griswold, Willard Hurst,
 Larry Kramer, Richard Posner, and David Shapiro for comments on an earlier version of this
 Commentary, which is distilled from the Introduction we are writing to the Foundation Press
 edition of The Legal Process. Many others have contributed to that Introduction from which
 this Commentary draws.
 1 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
 THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. I958).
 2 See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE I850S
 TO THE Ig8oS, at 270-7I (I983); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
 LAW I870-I960, at 253-55 (I992); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 7I IOWA L.
 REV. I063, I076-77 (I986); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 35I, 395-98
 (I973); Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
 i8, 29-30 (David Kairys ed., I982); Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decision
 Making, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 4I2, 4I5-I7 (I983).
 3 J.D. Hyman, Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28
 STAN. L. REv. I27I, I286 n.70 (I976).
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 back in the I98os and have become freshly relevant for a new gen-
 eration of lawyers.
 I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE LEGAL PROCESS:
 AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW, 1938-1941
 Public law scholarship in the first third of this century was in
 intellectual turmoil. Thinkers who viewed law as mechanical deduc-
 tion from authoritative premises were disputed by pragmatists and
 sociological jurisprudes; they, in turn were challenged by the legal
 realists, some of whom argued against any objectivity or reason in
 law.4 Notwithstanding these sharp disagreements, legal scholars
 achieved a remarkable consensus about three central ideas: law as
 policy, institutional competence, and principle and democratic open-
 ness as the basis for state legitimacy.
 The view of law as a policy science was the first concept to gain
 wide intellectual acceptance. After an unfolding elaboration of Justice
 Holmes's critique of formalism,5 by the I930S most scholars actively
 writing in the field of American public law agreed that law is the
 creation and elaboration of social policy. This proposition implied
 that legal decisionmakers should consider a utilitarian cost-benefit
 analysis when choosing one rule or policy over another.6 For example,
 by I942 legal academics all but unanimously urged courts to interpret
 statutes consistent with their animating policies or purposes and re-
 jected more formal approaches to statutory interpretation.7
 Justices Holmes and Brandeis argued from the law-is-policy con-
 cept that legislatures, not courts, are the most appropriate institutions
 to make social policy choices.8 From this suggestion, Justice Frank-
 furter developed the second great legal process concept, "institutional
 4 For overviews of this messy turbulence, see HORWITZ, cited above in note 2, at I09-2I2;
 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE I927-I960 passim (I986); and G. EDWARD WHITE,
 THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION I54-77 (I988).
 S See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, io HARV. L. REv. 457, 464-77 (I897).
 For later elaborations, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
 passim (I92I); JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW i-8 (I909); and Roscoe
 Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. I-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 59I
 (I9II), 25 HARV. L. REV. I40, 489 (I9I2).
 6 See L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 437 (I934).
 7 For instance, see (in chronological order) Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and
 Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2 passim (I939);
 Frederick J. de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REv.
 527, 53I-32 (I940); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
 Terms, 1937 and I938, 53 HARV. L. REV. 579, 623 (I940); and Max Radin, A Short Way with
 Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 398-99, 408-09, 422-23 (I942).
 8 See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 2I5, 262-63 (I9I8)
 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45, 75-76 (I905) (Holmes, J.,
 dissenting).
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 I994] THE LEGAL PROCESS 2033
 competence": in a government that seeks to advance the public inter-
 est, each organ has a special competence or expertise. The key to
 good government is not just figuring out the best policy, but also
 identifying which institutions should be making which decisions and
 how the different institutions can collaborate most productively.9 For
 example, administrative agencies were extolled as institutions best
 situated to implement and to elaborate upon regulatory regimes cre-
 ated by the New Deal. 10
 Just as the New Deal revealed the value of treating law as policy,
 Nazi Germany suggested the dangers of a purely instrumental view
 of law. But what made policy-driven American law any more legiti-
 mate than policy-driven Nazi law? Some thinkers distinguished Amer-
 ican law by asserting that it rested upon principle and reason; others
 distinguished it by reference to its open and democratic character.11
 Lon Fuller, in I940, offered a synthesis of the two ideas by positing
 that the democratic character of the United States ensured' the rea-
 sonableness of its laws.12 Law's legitimacy had both a substantive
 foundation in fidelity to principle and a procedural foundation in
 openness of participation. These twin sources of legitimacy were
 mutually reinforcing.
 II. CREATING THE LEGAL PROCESS:
 PUBLIC LAW TEACHING MATERIALS, 1938-1959
 The key ideas on which scholars reached a pre-World War II
 consensus formed the intellectual basis for law school courses that
 introduced students to public law in the regulatory state. Although
 early legislation courses were descriptive and doctrinal rather than
 jurisprudential in scope,13 the Harvard Law School course in "Leg-
 islation," introduced into the graduate program by James Landis in
 the years I929 through I934 and taught by Erwin Griswold from I934
 9 See Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October
 Term, I934, 49 HARV. L. REv. 68, 90-9I, 94-96 (I935); Hart, supra note 7, at 6I7-24.
 10 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6-46 (I938); Felix Frankfurter,
 The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 6I4, 6I7-I9 (I927).
 11 Primary sources are discussed in EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
 THEORY I59-78 (I973); David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Mi-
 nority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 74I, 746-6I (I98I); and
 Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, I5 CARDOZO
 L. REv. 6oi passim (I993).
 12 See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF I23 (I940) ("[I]t is only in a
 democratic and constitutionally organized state that ideas [i.e., principles] have a chance to
 make their influence felt.").
 13 See, e.g., FREDERICK J. DE SLOOVtRE, CASES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES at
 ix-xi (I93I) (used at New York University); FRANK E. HORACK, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS
 ON LEGISLATION at iii (1940) (used at Indiana University).
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 to I936, integrated the doctrinal material into larger jurisprudential
 debates. 14 Additionally, Frankfurter loosely organized his courses in
 "Public Utilities" and "Federal Courts" around the concept that suc-
 cessful legal policy depends upon the proper structure and allocation
 of institutional responsibilities. 15 Two of Frankfurter's students,
 Henry Hart and Willard Hurst, transformed the teaching of public
 law in American law schools.
 Together with Lloyd Garrison, Hurst developed a first-year course
 on "Law in Society" at the University of Wisconsin.16 The first in-
 tegrated treatment of public lawmaking, the I940 edition of the Law
 in Society materials17 used the history of legal remedies for industrial
 accidents to develop both systematically and concretely the three key
 legal process concepts identified above. Although Hurst's materials
 were the first effort to integrate these three concepts into the teaching
 of public law, it was Henry Hart who completed the project of syn-
 thesizing the three pre-World War II concepts into a systematic way
 of teaching and thinking about legislation (specifically) and public law
 (more generally).
 A. Feller, Gellhorn, and Hart,"Materials on Legislation," 1940-1942
 Although Hart had joined the Harvard faculty in I934, he did not
 teach "Legislation" until the I938-I939 academic year. In I940, the
 Harvard Law School Catalog described Hart's class as one "concerned
 with study of the function of legislation and its operation as part of
 the legal process."'18 By I940, Hart entered into a joint enterprise to
 develop legislation materials with his friends Abe Feller (at Yale) and
 Walter Gellhorn (at Columbia); the trio produced its first unpublished
 edition of Materials on Legislation19 for use at the three schools in
 the I94I-I942 academic year.
 Like the Garrison and Hurst materials, the Feller, Gellhorn, and
 Hart materials were organized around the concept that the dynamic
 14 See Letter from Henry J. Fox, Professor, Stetson University College of Law, to Henry
 M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School (May 3, I940), in Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
 Harvard Law School Library, Box 3, Folder 6 [hereinafter Hart Papers]; Letter from Erwin N.
 Griswold, former Dean, Harvard Law School, to William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
 att. at I (Oct. I2, I993) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
 15 Telephone Interview with J. Willard Hurst, Professor Emeritus, Wisconsin Law School
 (Aug. 24, I993).
 16 Id.
 17 See Lloyd K. Garrison & Willard Hurst, Law in Society: A Course Designed for Under-
 graduates and Beginning Law Students (rev. ed. I940) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
 the Harvard Law School Library).
 18 Program of Instruction, OFFICIAL REG. HARV. UNIV., Apr. 29, I940, at 20-2I.
 19 A.H. Feller, Walter Gellhorn & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Materials on Legislation for Use in
 1941-1942 (Ist unpublished ed., n.d.), in Albert M. Sacks Papers, Harvard Law School Library
 [hereinafter Sacks Papers].
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 '9941 THE LEGAL PROCESS 2035
 interaction of different institutions creates public policy. The I94I-
 I942 materials began with "An Introduction to Methods of Law-
 Making," originally drafted by Hart and Feller to make explicit com-
 parisons of lawmaking through the common law, statutes, adminis-
 trative rulemaking, and private interaction.20 The chapter included
 Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's opinion in Norway Plains,2' which de-
 ployed a policy-based methodology to generate common law rules
 regarding common carrier liability for damages to goods stored after
 transit.22 The authors traced the evolution of carrier liability rules as
 established by private behavior, common law regulation in and after
 Norway Plains, legislation, and, finally, administrative regulation. As
 Gellhorn put it, this exercise revealed "the lack of adaptation of
 judicial machinery for acquiring insight into the social and economic
 data upon which 'policy' judgments rest," in contrast to "the avail-
 ability to the legislature of information or machinery the courts do
 not possess," such as the power to delegate to agencies, the fact-
 finding capability of legislative investigations and designated commis-
 sions, and a greater "arsenal of sanctions."23 Hart saw the Norway
 Plains exercise as a general introduction to the "processes by which
 this 'law' is created."24
 Unlike Hurst's materials, Hart's materials did not restrict them-
 selves to the single issue of carrier liability; he and his co-authors
 planned to treat numerous other problem areas in the first chapter,
 which in the I94I-I942 edition was followed by materials on stare
 decisis, retroactivity, and other doctrinal topics. The materials used
 by Hart in I94I-I942 concluded with chapters on "Some Basic Con-
 ditions of the Exercise of Law-Making Power" through the coordina-
 tion of the legislature, courts, and agencies, and on "Statutory Inter-
 pretation."25 Hart used these latter chapters to pursue the doctrinal
 ramifications of thinking about law as the interplay of various insti-
 20 See id. at i; Henry M. Hart, Jr., Suggested Outline of a Legislation Casebook for Use in
 I94I-I942, at 5-8 (n.d.), in Sacks Papers, supra note I9 (laying out Hart's vision of this
 chapter); Letter from Walter Gellhorn, Professor, Columbia University School of Law, to A.H.
 Feller, Professor, Yale Law School, & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School
 (Jan. 29, I941), in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box 24, Folder i (describing the chapter as
 drafted by Hart and Feller).
 21 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 67 Mass. (i Gray) 263 (I854).
 22 See id. at 2 70-76.
 23 Letter from Walter Gellhorn to A.H. Feller & Henry M. Hart, Jr., supra note 20, at 2.
 24 Hart, supra note 20, at 3. He wrote in his Suggested Outline of a Legislation Casebook:
 "I conceive of law as concerned with the ordering of society and of that ordering as involving
 an interplay[,] actual or potential, in a host of variant combinations, between doctrinal formu-
 lations (law in a narrower sense) on the one hand and the exercise of official powers on the
 other." Id. at 1-2.
 25 The version of the materials actually used by Hart differs from the version labeled "first
 unpublished edition," collected in the Sacks Papers, cited above in note i9.
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 tutions, each of which has a special competence and special procedures
 tailored to its institutional functions.
 During the I94I-I942 academic year, the co-authors exchanged
 proposals for organizing the book. Gellhorn pressed for a doctrinally
 focused structure, while Hart envisioned a more conceptual ap-
 proach.26 Feller, Gellhorn, and Hart executed a contract for publi-
 cation with Foundation Press on February i8, I942,27 but World War
 II pulled the co-authors away from this project and into government.
 Hart took a leave of absence from Harvard in I942 to become Asso-
 ciate General Counsel of the Office of Price Administration (OPA),
 and the legislation course was not offered at Harvard during World
 War II. After the war, the authors, by mutual agreement, abandoned
 their "unfinished symphony."28
 B. Hart, "Legislation," I946-I954
 Hart's experience in OPA exposed him to the integrated legal
 system in action. The agency devised general economic plans at the
 same time it confronted myriad particular problems of application all
 over the country. The OPA experience filled Hart with a new enthu-
 siasm for teaching legislation.29 In constrast to its pre-war predeces-
 sor, Hart's post-war legislation class was more optimistic about the
 possibilities of developing law as a policy science to facilitate the
 smooth operation of society; offered a more sophisticated theory of
 institutional competence; and, more explicitly normativist, insisted
 that law be developed through a process of reasoned application of
 basic principle.30
 26 Compare Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School, to Walter
 Gellhorn, Professor, Columbia University School of Law, and Abe Feller, Professor, Yale Law
 School (Sept. II, I94I), in Sacks Papers, supra note I9 (emphasizing a simplified structure,
 including an introduction to lawmaking and basic conditions on its exercise, a section on the
 formulation and execution of legislative policy, and concluding with statutory interpretation and
 application) with Walter Gellhorn, Suggested Outline of a Legislation Casebook (Jan. 2, I942),
 in Sacks Papers, supra note I9 (insisting on a more elaborate, doctrinally focused organization,
 with eleven chapters).
 27 The contract can be found in the Hart Papers, cited above in note I4, Box 24, Folder I.
 A proposed outline of Materials on Legislation started with chapters on lawmaking generally
 (Hart's project) but then continued with a series of doctrinal chapters (Gellhorn's project) on the
 legislative process, indefinite statutes, delegation to public and private decisionmakers, execution
 of legislative policy, administrative procedure, drafting statutes, promulgation and form, and
 interpretation and application of statutes. See Hart, supra note 20.
 28 Letter from Walter Gellhorn, Professor, Columbia University School of Law, to Henry
 M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School (Apr. 8, I947), in Hart Papers, supra note 14,
 Box 24, Folder I.
 29 Interview with Abram Chayes, Professor Emeritus, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge,
 Mass. (Aug. I7, 1993). Chayes was a student in Hart's I948 legislation course.
 30 See generally Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School, to Robert
 Kramer, Professor, Duke University (Jan. 23, I948), in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box 4,
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 Hart started the class with the question: "What is our idea of
 law?"3' He then suggested that "[law] is the aggregate of the processes
 of social ordering . . . [w]ith a view to promoting ends accepted as
 valid in the society."32 This answer reflected the eve-of-war consen-
 sus, which Hart contrasted with the traditional views of law as pre-
 dicting judicial decisions: "The one is an inert, remote-from-life notion,
 summoning up a picture of a desiccated English solution. . . . The
 other [is] dynamic and vital."33 Hart maintained that law plays an
 important role in the entire system for meeting human wants and
 desires in a complex society, and that the goal of social ordering is
 "not [ ] dividing up a pie of fixed size but [ ] making a larger pie
 in which all the slices will be bigger."34 This claim reveals at the core
 of the course a very optimistic view of government. Hart also pressed
 his students to think in cost-benefit terms: What is the objective, and
 is it socially acceptable? What means will fairly and efficiently achieve
 the objective? Is the cost reasonable given the value of the objective
 and the alternative means available?35
 After exploring what law is, Hart turned to the creation of legal
 duties. As in his pre-war course, Hart started with Norway Plains
 but mined the case to develop a theory of appropriate judicial law-
 making, the relationship among the different institutional lawmakers,
 and their comparative institutional capabilities. Hart aggressively crit-
 icized Judge Shaw's opinion for "making a judgment as to what would
 be a good rule,"36 rather than making a "reasoned application . . . of
 basic principle"37 to the case. Shaw's approach was unacceptable, not
 because it was judicial lawmaking (inevitable in the case), but because
 Folder I I (noting that the post-war course was "on another track" than the pre-war course).
 We have a precise picture of how Hart taught the course because his own thoroughly composed
 class notes are preserved, as are the mimeographed materials he used to teach the seminar in
 I950, I95I, and I952. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Notes and Other Materials for the Study of
 Legislation (I950) [hereinafter Study of Legislation] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
 Harvard Law School Library, Red Set); Sacks Papers, supra note I9 (containing mimeographed
 versions of the I95i and I952 materials).
 31 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Legislation Notes, Summer Term I947, at 9 (June II, I947) [here-
 inafter Legislation Notes, Summer I947], in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box I5, Folder 5. In
 the I948 course, Hart's first question was, "What is our idea of 'law,' Mr. Sacks, President of
 the 'Law' Review?" Interview with Abram Chayes, supra note 29.
 32 Legislation Notes, Summer I947, supra note 3I, June ii, I947, at 9-io; see also Henry
 M. Hart, Jr., Legislation Notes, Oct. 22, I946, at 6-7 [hereinafter Legislation Notes, I946-
 I947], in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box I5, Folder 4.
 33 Legislation Notes, Summer I947, supra note 3I, June I3, I947, at 2.
 34 Id. at 4. Hart's notes suggest that "in any situation of conflict of interest within a society
 it is always possible to work out a solution in which all interests are better off than they were
 before. " Id. at 5.
 35 These queries are recorded in Sacks's notes, taken during Hart's legislation course in I948.
 See Sacks Papers, supra note I9. The exact date is not clear from the notes.
 36 Legislation Notes, I946-I947, supra note 32, Oct. 29, I946, at 7.
 37 Id. at 6.
This content downloaded from 
             143.229.43.66 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 15:58:16 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 2038 HARVARD LAWREVIEW [Vol. 107:2031
 it was lawmaking beyond the capability of a court. "A court in
 making law is bound to base its action, not on free judgment of
 relative social advantage, but on a process of reasoned development
 of authoritative starting-points (i.e., statutes, prior judicial decisions,
 etc.[,] etc.)."38 From this conception of judging, Hart developed the
 outline of a distinctive theory of reasoned adjudication that linked
 judges' roles in common law and statutory interpretation cases.39
 Like Hurst, Hart explored the comparative advantages that leg-
 islatures and agencies have vis-a-vis courts. The function of legisla-
 tures should be to ascertain "legislative facts" about society in order
 to determine general rules. Courts should defer to the legislature's
 findings and policy judgments. Agencies have comparative institu-
 tional advantages over both courts and legislatures in applying rules
 or principles to problems, because they have the legislature's ability
 to engage in ambitious fact-finding and the courts' option of focusing
 on one problem at a time.40 Hart discussed the various factors that
 should determine the mode of action agencies should take in particular
 situations: Should the agency proceed through legislature-like rule-
 making or through court-like adjudication?
 Starting in I946-I947, Hart explored issues of statutory interpre-
 tation in particular detail. He developed as a "useful starting point"
 an approach similar to the one pressed in the academic literature after
 I938: "Find out the purpose of your statute, and [c]onstrue it to carry
 out the purpose, if . . . [t]he language will bear that meaning [and]
 . . .[t]he policy of clear statement will [not] be violated by giving it
 that meaning."'41 In exploring many different statutory interpretation
 decisions, Hart preferred practical, dynamic, policy-oriented applica-
 tions of statutes over legalistic, static, and linguistically or historically
 oriented interpretations. He supported the authority of agencies to
 change their statutory interpretations and endorsed judicial deference
 to any "permissible" administrative construction.42
 Hart's legislation course evolved more slowly after I946-I947,
 continuing in the directions suggested by his first post-war classes.
 Hart's course changed dramatically when Harvard (in response to the
 recommendation of a committee chaired by Lon Fuller that "perspec-
 tives" courses be offered) made "Legislation" a special second-year
 elective.43 During the first year of the experiment, Hart wrote Stanley
 38 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
 39 See infra text accompanying notes 4I-42.
 40 This argument is made at scattered points in Legislation Notes, Summer I947, cited above
 in note 3I.
 41 Legislation Notes, Summer I947, supra note 3I, Aug. I5, I947, at I.
 42 See Legislation Notes, I946-I947, supra note 32, Dec. Io, I946, at 2, 8-9.
 43 Interview with Erwin N. Griswold, former Dean, Harvard Law School, in Washington,
 D.C. (May I9, I993).
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 I994] THE LEGAL PROCESS 2039
 Surrey of his course - which he dubbed "Processes of Lawmaking,
 with a Heavy Infusion of Jurisprudence" - that he had altered its
 format considerably.44 The new format impelled Hart to develop
 mimeographed materials for the larger classes. The materials for the
 I950-I95i academic year commenced with a long initial chapter on
 "The Nature and Function of Law and Legislation" and then delved
 into "Some Problems of Case-by-Case Lawmaking," starting with Nor-
 way Plains and concluding with issues of stare decisis. Hart then
 taught additional materials on statutory interpretation and, after I950,
 drafted a new chapter on that topic.45
 The materials developed by Hart between I947 and I953 contain
 the most carefully worked-out theory of law to appear in teaching
 materials of this period.46 The centerpiece was a "Note on Some
 Essentials of a Working Theory of Law, "47 which went through at
 least one extensive rewrite after I950.48 The Note rejected the tra-
 ditional social contract view that law's role is to keep atomistic human
 beings from one another's throats. Instead, Hart posited that "perhaps
 the crucial fact about any society is the interdependence of its mem-
 bers" and that law's role is "the task of creating and maintaining the
 conditions for collaboration among the members of society. "49 In his
 post-I95o revision, Hart argued that, as a response to social problems,
 law "is dynamic and not static. It is a doing of something, an activity
 with a purpose. . . . We come to see that every legal problem is a
 problem of purpose, of means to an end. 50 Deepening the perspective
 that coalesced in legal academe between I938 and I94I, this theory
 of law resembled the then recently published work of faculty colleague
 and friend, Lon Fuller.51 Like Fuller, Hart insisted that law cannot
 44 See Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School, to Stanley Surrey,
 Professor, University of California School of Jurisprudence, at I (Feb. i8, I950), in Hart Papers,
 supra note I4, Box 6, Folder I5.
 45 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., untitled draft of ch. IV, in Hart Papers, supra note I9, Box i8,
 Folder 3. We found the original handwritten draft for this chapter in the Sacks Papers, but
 the penned segments (interspersed with notes to the secretary to copy excerpts from cases) are
 in Hart's distinctive and elegant handwriting. See Sacks Papers, supra note I9. The chapter
 is virtually identical to the statutory interpretation chapter in the four drafts of "Legal Process"
 materials Hart assembled with Sacks. See infra note 64.
 46 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A SELECTION OF READ-
 INGS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMMENTS PREPARED BY THE EDITOR (temp. ed. I949); Garrison &
 Hurst, supra note I7.
 47 See Study of Legislation, supra note 30, at 48-59.
 48 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Note on Some Essentials of a Working Theory of Law (revised,
 n.d.), in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box I7, Folder i.
 49 Study of Legislation, supra note 30, at 49.
 50 Hart, supra note 48, at 29.
 51 See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 6i6, 62I,
 623-24 (I949) (presenting the fictitious opinion of Foster, J., a stand-in for Fuller); see also
 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory
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 be just descriptive science, for what the law "is" at any given time is
 "indissolubly connected" with what it ought to be.52
 In the I950 version of the Note, Hart developed a section entitled
 "Law as system of institutional settlement,"53 which emphasized a
 procedural understanding of law as "a series of institutionalized pro-
 cesses for settling by authority of the group various types of questions
 of concern to the group. 54 Law as institutional process was a theme
 that similarly inspired Fuller's curricular reform efforts and on which
 Fuller had published in I948.55 The post-I95o revision of the Note,
 entitled "Law as a Process (or System of Processes) of Institutional
 Settlement," argued that "the first recourse of law, in dealing with
 intractable questions, is to seek not final answers but an acceptable
 procedure for getting acceptable answers. "56 In an important intellec-
 tual move, Hart then maintained that process mediates law and mor-
 als: "decisions which are the due result of those [institutional] processes
 must, by that fact alone, have a moral claim to acceptance."57 In
 this and accompanying passages, Hart advanced a procedural theory
 of legitimacy that gave moral as well as legal sanction to the status
 quo, albeit with a narrowly defined normative escape clause: "Only
 when institutional procedures bar change, or fail to produce it, do
 morals and law come in direct conflict. The individual conscience has
 then the question whether to respect the institutional decision. "58
 C. Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process, I953-I958
 After I953 (when Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
 Federal System was published59), Hart concentrated on expanding
 and redrafting his legislation materials. During the I954-I955 aca-
 demic year, Hart was a visiting professor at Ohio State University
 College of Law, and Albert Sacks taught the legislation elective at
 Interpretation in a Nutshell, 6i GEO. WASH. L. REV. 173I, 1742-43 (1993) (discussing Fuller's
 role as "a parent of legal process theory").
 52 Hart, supra note 48, at 32; cf. FULLER, supra note 12, at 9-IO (analogy between law and
 anecdote); Fuller, supra note 6, at 452 (interconnection between "is" and "ought" in law).
 53 Study of Legislation, supra note 30, at 53-56.
 54 Id. at 54.
 55 See Lon L. Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, I J.
 LEGAL EDUC. I89, I92-95 (I948-I949). We have no clear view of how much Hart owed to
 Fuller. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305,
 307 (1971) (attributing institutional competence theory to Hart and Sacks).
 56 Hart, supra note 48, at 34.
 57 Id. at 36.
 58 Id. Even then, Hart claimed, "institutional procedures do not cease to be relevant. For
 the moral claim to acceptance of the result of those procedures varies, and must vary, according
 to the fairness of the procedures by which the currently prevailing result was reached and
 according to the fairness of the corrective process provided for changing that result." Id.
 59 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
 SYSTEM (I953).
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 Harvard.60 Sacks had been a student in Hart's legislation course in
 I948 and was one of Hart's favorite students of all time. Sacks had
 joined the Harvard faculty in I952 and had taught the legislation
 course since the fall of that year.
 By I954 (and probably earlier), Hart had entered into a collabo-
 rative arrangement with Sacks to develop much more ambitious ma-
 terials on the legal system. Each year between I955 and I958, Hart
 and Sacks produced a new (and longer) draft of materials that, in
 I957, they entitled The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
 and Application of Law.61 Ironically, Hart and Sacks were not the
 first to use this title for a law school course and its materials. Carl
 Auerbach and Samuel Mermin of Wisconsin revised the Garrison and
 Hurst materials and published them in multilithed form in I956 (and
 regular print in I96I) as The Legal Process,62 the same title that Hart
 and Sacks chose in I957. It appears that the two groups of authors
 came up with the same title independently.63
 The overall plan of The Legal Process was similar to that of Hart's
 legislation course: it began with the nature and institutions of law,
 examined the different lawmaking institutions (including private law-
 making), and concluded with statutory interpretation. The architec-
 ture of the materials remained quite stable, even as the materials
 expanded in length.64 There are two notable exceptions to this gen-
 60 See Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School, to Carl A. Auerbach,
 Professor, Wisconsin Law School, and Samuel Mermin, Professor, Wisconsin Law School (Mar.
 4, I959), in Hart Papers, supra note 14, Box i, Folder 3 (discussing Hart's visit and Sacks's
 taking over the course).
 61 See id. The first (I955) draft was entitled Materials for a General View of the American
 Legal System and was used in the I955-I956 "Legislation" course. The draft was also the basis
 for the contract Hart and Sacks entered into with Foundation Press on March 23, 1956 to
 publish a casebook entitled [The] American Legal System. The second (I956) draft of the
 materials had the same title, but the name of the course in the I956-I957 school year was "The
 American Legal System." During the winter of I956-I957, Hart and Sacks decided to call both
 the course (taught in academic year 1957-1958) and the third (I957) draft of the materials, The
 Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law. The fourth (I958) draft
 and the course taught in I958-I959 bore the same title. The four drafts of the materials can
 be found in the "Red Set" of faculty works at the Harvard Law School Library.
 62 See CARL A. AUERBACH & SAMUEL MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION
 TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
 - A REVISION OF LAW IN SOCIETY BY LLOYD K. GARRISON & WILLARD HURST (rev. ed.
 I956) (multilithed materials).
 63 Hart wrote to his OPA friends Auerbach and Mermin that he and Sacks had not known
 of Auerbach and Mermin's title and that the "main part" of their own title was the idea of
 David Cavers; Hart opined that there was probably no legal problem with publishing books
 with the same title (but different subtitles). See Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr. to Carl A.
 Auerbach and Samuel Mermin, supra note 6o. Auerbach and Mermin acquiesced in Hart's
 overture. See Letter from Samuel Mermin, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, to Henry
 M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School (Mar. 7, 1959), in Hart Papers, supra note 14, at
 Box 5, Folder 6.
 64 The 1958 draft, for the most part, included the same chapters as the 1955 draft (though
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 eralization. One is Chapter II of the I955 draft, on "The Making and
 Amending of Constitutions." The text of this chapter was eliminated
 in I956, but in the I956 through I958 editions the table of contents
 retained a marker for a proposed Chapter VIII on constitutional law.65
 The other exception was Chapter I, which introduced students to the
 nature and function of law, and to most of the concepts and vocab-
 ulary in the materials. The co-authors substantially rewrote this chap-
 ter in every draft and experimented with different expositions of the
 key concepts, different orderings of the problems and exposition, and
 different ways of presenting the problems.
 The intellectual effort invested in this chapter was worthwhile.
 Chapter I sounded the main themes for the entire project, which was
 an ambitious synthesis and elaboration of the three pre-war traditions:
 law as policy, the importance of institutional relationships, and legit-
 imacy based on principle and democratic openness. The materials set
 forth for a I950S audience a familiar yet original way of thinking
 about law and the legal system.
 i. The Reasoned Elaboration of Purposive Law. - The Hart and
 Sacks materials posit a theory of society inspired by the New Deal
 that differs from traditional liberal (social contract) theory. Central
 to society is people's recognition of "the fact of their interdependence
 with other human beings and the community of interest which grows
 out of it. So recognizing, people form themselves into groups for the
 protection and advancement of their common interests ....7766 The
 state is the "over-riding, general purpose group"67 that has the greatest
 responsibility for "'establishing, maintaining and perfecting the con-
 ditions necessary for community life to perform its role in the complete
 development of man. "'68 In accord with this activist view of the state,
 Hart and Sacks concluded: "Law is a doing of something, a purposive
 activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social
 living. 7769
 in a different order). Most of the chapters were not rewritten but just got longer from year to
 year; the materials grew from 864 pages (1955) to II77 pages (1956) to 1343 pages (1957) to
 1417 pages (1958).
 65 Hart's notes to the 1956 draft reveal that he hoped Chapter VIII would consist of five or
 six problems on protections against ex post facto laws, the Eighteenth Amendment, home rule
 for municipalities, the election of judges, constitutional interpretation, and constitutional torts
 (with the last two possibly combined). His expectation was that Chapters VIII and IX (consti-
 tutional remedies) of the 1958 draft would be combined into a single chapter. See Hart Papers,
 supra note 14, Box 26, Folder 2.
 66 HART & SACKS, supra note i, at 2.
 67 Id.
 68 Id. at Iio (quoting Joseph M. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT
 UNDER LAW 91, 96 (Arthur E. Sutherland ed., I968)).
 69 Id. at i66.
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 The purposiveness of law generates Hart and Sacks's theory of
 "reasoned elaboration."70 General directives often do not transpar-
 ently tell officials and citizens what to do in specific situations, but
 that does not mean that officials simply interpret ambiguous language
 to reflect their own political values. To the contrary, an official
 applying a "general directive arrangement" must "elaborate the ar-
 rangement in a way which is consistent with the other established
 applications of it" and "must do so in the way which best serves the
 principles and policies it expresses. "71 Hart and Sacks extended this
 idea to legal interpretation and presumed that "every statute and every
 doctrine of unwritten law developed by the decisional process has
 some kind of purpose or objective,"72 and that each should be applied
 in ways that subserve both their purposes and the general purposes
 of the law.73 Chapter I's "Case of the Spoiled Heir," for example,
 suggested that state inheritance statutes might be interpreted to ex-
 clude a murderer from sharing in the estate of his victim.74
 2. Law as an Institutional System: Rules & Standards, Policies
 & Principles. - As a purposive system, law contains a number of
 substantive arrangements to coordinate people's conduct. But Hart
 and Sacks emphasized the greater importance of the "constitutive or
 procedural understandings or arrangements" by which the substantive
 arrangements are applied, interpreted, and changed.75 To tackle the
 complex issues of a dynamic and diverse society, Hart and Sacks
 advocated the broad dispersion of decisionmaking.76 Because of the
 "boundless and unpredictable variety" of our dynamic society, they
 asserted that "private ordering is the primary process of social ad-
 justment."77 To the extent that private ordering does not work, Hart
 and Sacks contemplated an interaction between private and public
 institutions - with authority allocated according to each institution's
 relative "competence" to handle the matter. For example, although
 they accepted the conventional view that the common law is the
 "initial resort" for problems not solved privately, Hart and Sacks were
 concerned "with the shortcomings of the common law" and sought
 70 See generally id. at I62-68 ("The Process of Reasoned Elaboration of Purportedly Deter-
 minate Directions"); id. at I68-71 ("The Reasoned Elaboration of Avowedly Indeterminate
 Directions").
 71 Id. at i65.
 72 Id. at I66; see also id. at 1156 ("The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is
 foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible.").
 73 See id. at 421-27 (regarding the judicial interpretation of common law precedents); id. at
 I66-67, 1179-1203 (regarding the judicial interpretation of statutes).
 74 See id. at 75-I10 (drawing upon Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. I88 (I889)).
 75 Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
 76 See id. at i80-83.
 77 Id. at I83.
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 solutions in "the more sophisticated types of administered regulation
 or non-regulatory control."78 Hart's old Norway Plains exercise intro-
 duces students to this problem in Chapter II.
 Hart and Sacks then explored the ways in which legislated policy
 choices interact with implementational discretion. One way is through
 the choice of rules versus standards.79 If the legislature decides to
 deal with a problem through specific rules, it expresses its confidence
 that it has sufficient information to solve the social problem. If the
 legislature is unsure of how to proceed, it will adopt a standard,
 which essentially delegates rulemaking responsibilities to courts, agen-
 cies, or private institutions. In the New Deal tradition, Hart and
 Sacks accepted the legislature's power simply to set forth a "policy,"
 or social objective, and vest discretion in an agency to carry it out.80
 Even then, official discretion is usually limited by more specific state-
 ments of a policy or by an underlying "principle" (that is, a policy
 supported by reasons it will be good for society). If underlying sta-
 tutory policy is ambiguous, "the official should interpret it in the way
 which best harmonizes with more basic principles and policies of
 law. "81 Recall the "Case of the Spoiled Heir. "82
 3. The Centrality of Process. - In a government of dispersed
 power and diverse views about substantive issues, frequently "the
 substance of decision cannot be planned in advance in the form of
 rules and standards," but "the procedure of decision commonly can
 be."83 Procedure is important in three different ways. To begin, a
 procedure that "is soundly adapted to the type of power to be exercised
 is conducive to well-informed and wise decisions. An unsound pro-
 cedure invites ill-informed and unwise ones."84 The suggestion that
 "the best criterion of sound legislation is the test of whether it is the
 product of a sound process of enactment" epitomizes the legal process
 philosophy.85 Additionally, procedure is the means by which each
 part of the interconnected institutional system works together
 smoothly. Process not only defines the roles and duties of the different
 institutions, but also provides mechanisms for controlling discretion
 78 Id. at 366.
 79 See id. at 155-58.
 80 See id. at 159-60.
 81 Id. at I65. Thus, basic principles and policies form the basis for extending a rule or
 statute to a novel context, see id. at 386-406; for reformulating old rules or provisions, see id.
 at 1407-26; and even for replacing prior rules or practices with new ones, see id. at 565-89.
 82 See supra p. 2043 and note 74.
 83 HART & SACKS, supra note i, at 173.
 84 Id. The procedures that facilitate good policy decisions by legislatures, for example, are
 openness to the views of all affected persons and groups, focus on factual information subjected
 to expert and critical scrutiny, and public deliberation through which the pros and cons are
 thoroughly discussed. See id. at 715-I6.
 85 Id. at 715. The quotation is a rhetorical question in The Legal Process.
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 and for self-correction.86 Lastly, process is critical to law's legitimacy.
 The "principle of institutional settlement" was, for Hart and Sacks,
 "the central idea of law."87 In a passage that was the most revised
 in the materials, the authors insisted that "decisions which are the
 duly arrived at result of duly established procedures [for making
 decisions] of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole
 society unless and until they are changed."88
 This statement of legal obligation was succinct, elegant, and
 straightforward: citizens have a duty to follow "duly arrived at" de-
 cisions by the state. This was a more sweeping expression of legiti-
 macy than those (such as Fuller's) made on the eve of World War II.
 Gone were the idealistic appeals to either democracy or reason. What
 remained was a procedure-based positivism that lacked even the rec-
 ognition Hart was willing to make in the post-I950 legislation mate-
 rials that law and morals might clash when "institutional procedures
 bar change, or fail to produce it."89 This flatter statement of legal
 obligation reflected a deep satisfaction and confidence that lawyers
 felt during the era of economic growth and consensus politics in
 America after World War II. It epitomized the hopeful, yet implicitly
 defensive, philosophy of an entire generation in the law.
 III. DENOUEMENT: THE LEGAL PROCESS TRADITION,
 1959-PRESENT
 Hart and Sacks contemnplated that their materials would be pub-
 lished for use in the I958-i959 academic year, a date that was pushed
 back on a yearly basis after the co-authors failed to meet their I958
 86 For the administrative process, such safeguards include "the arrangements which prescribe
 the procedure to be followed in exercising . . . power: the information which must be secured;
 the people whose views must be listened to; the findings and justification of the decision which
 must be made; and the formal requisites of action which must be observed." Id. at I73. For
 the legislative process, the safeguards include the constitutional requirements of bicameralism
 and presentment, the rules and safeguards adopted voluntarily by Congress, and the "ultimate
 check" of the ballot box. See id. at I72-73, I78-79. For the judicial process, safeguards include
 the due process guarantees of notice, an impartial decisionmaker, and a right to appeal, as well
 as prudential limitations on the types of cases or controversies that courts hear. See id. at 652-
 69.
 87 Id. at 4.
 88 Id. Hart and Sacks continue:
 When the principle of institutional settlement is plainly applicable, we say that the law
 "is" thus and so, and brush aside further discussion of what it "ought" to be. Yet the
 "is" is not really an "is" but a special kind of "ought" - a statement that, for the reasons
 just reviewed, a decision which is the duly arrived at result of a duly established procedure
 for making decisions of that kind "ought" to be accepted as binding upon the whole
 society unless and until it has been duly changed.
 Id. at 4-5.
 89 Hart, supra note 48, at 36.
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 deadline.90 Although we can only speculate about why the materials
 were never published, the authors' ill health9l derailed their one-new-
 draft-a-year pace for revising the materials, and they never got back
 on track. Another contributory factor was Hart's longstanding per-
 fectionism, which became more pronounced after 1959.92 Moreover,
 he and Sacks must have seen revision as a daunting task, as the
 Warren Court's constitutional activism was changing the landscape of
 public law.
 Hart's death in I969 left the materials without their "senior editor,"
 and Sacks (just as much a perfectionist as Hart) was preoccupied by
 his service as Dean of the Harvard Law School from I97I to I98I.
 Nonetheless, Sacks retained a series of talented research assistants to
 develop new problems and update the old ones, and beginning in I983
 he discussed the possibility of collaborating with Norman Dorsen of
 New York University to publish an updated version of The Legal
 Process.93 The task of updating the materials properly would have
 been overwhelming, however. Sacks himself suffered severe health
 problems in the late I970S and I98os. He died in i99i, still hoping
 to revise The Legal Process.
 Notwithstanding its tentative and (until later this year) unpub-
 lished status, Hart and Sacks's The Legal Process is an important
 document. It has had a great run as teaching materials. The Legal
 Process was the basis for the first- and second-year perspectives course
 90 Compare Letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School, to Thomas H.
 Eliot, Professor, Washington University (Sept. 26, 1957), in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box 2,
 Folder I8 (indicating that Hart's goal then was possibly to get into print for student use in the
 fall of 1958) with Allen M. Singer, Harvard's New Course in the Legal Process - A Pattern
 for a More Comprehensive New Legal Education, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 25I, 25I n.fI (I959)
 (indicating that the materials were expected to be published for academic year 1959-1960).
 91 Sacks had back problems that incapacitated him and kept him from working on the
 materials in early 1959, and a series of operations on his wife Sadelle diverted him before that.
 See Letter from Albert M. Sacks, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Eugene V. Rostow, Dean,
 Yale Law School (July 14, 1959), in Sacks Papers, supra note I9. Hart's several-pack-a-day
 cigarette habit fueled emphysema and other lung ailments. In the spring of I960, Hart was
 incapacitated by an aneurysm, a condition that was remedied by one of the earliest open heart
 surgeries. Elizabeth Hart Miller, Hart's daughter, provided us with information on his personal
 habits. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Hart Miller (Jan. 19, 1994).
 92 Hart's I963 Holmes Lectures illustrate the intellectual paralysis engendered by his perfec-
 tionism. He presented a detailed argument in the first two lectures. During the third and final
 lecture, Hart announced that his proposed resolution did not work and sat down before a
 stunned audience. Although the terms of the Holmes Lectures required a manuscript to be
 delivered for publication, Hart never worked out the problems with his argument and never
 delivered a manuscript. Interview with Erwin N. Griswold, supra note 43.
 93 See Letter from Norman Dorsen, Professor, New York University School of Law, to
 William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey 2 (Feb. 8, I994) (on file with the Harvard Law
 School Library). Dorsen taught from the materials for three decades at New York University
 and at Harvard in 1983 and I984 and developed his own extensive supplemental materials. See
 id.
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 at Harvard Law School for three decades94 and was regularly taught
 at dozens of other schools during that period.95 Alumnae and alumni
 of the course include some of the most prominent public law scholars
 of this period, as well as four current Justices (Antonin Scalia, An-
 thony Kennedy, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg) and a
 Justice-designate (Stephen Breyer) of the Supreme Court. The Legal
 Process has influenced new generations of law professors who never
 took the course.96 The materials figure prominently in the recent
 revival of statutory interpretation as a field of academic inquiry and
 in much-discussed theories of constitutional law and jurisprudence.
 A. The Legal Process Generation
 Hart and Sacks's materials represent a collective effort to synthes-
 ize the lessons of pre-war American law and present them to a post-
 war nation. The effort was that of a generation, not just a pair of
 scholars. To illustrate, many of the most important public law think-
 ers of that generation came together at the "Legal Philosophy Discus-
 sion Group" organized at Harvard Law School in the I956-I957
 academic year. Its membership of more than thirty professors in-
 cluded Hart and Sacks, Lon Fuller, Paul Freund, and three visiting
 professors, H.L.A. Hart, Herbert Wechsler, and Julius Stone.97
 The topic for the year was "Judicial and Administrative Discre-
 tion," and the chief issue was how to have a dynamic, problem-solving
 94 According to the Law School's catalogs, compiled for us by the Harvard Law School
 Registrar, "The Legal Process" was continuously taught as a second-year elective from the Fall
 Term 1958 through the Spring Term I979, with a lapse in academic year 1976-1977. "The
 Legal Process" was offered as a first-year elective by Sacks in Spring Terms 1973-1976, 1978,
 and I983-1990.
 95 Among the schools using the materials were the law schools at Albany, Boston College,
 Boston University, Buffalo, Catholic, Colorado, Columbia, Connecticut, Georgetown, Indiana,
 Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York University, Ohio State, Stanford, Texas,
 Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Yale. Interview with Donna Chiozzi, former secretary to
 Dean Albert M. Sacks, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Aug. 19, I993). See also
 Byse, supra note 2, at 1076 n.28 (estimating that 40 to 50 law schools taught The Legal Process
 at its peak); Sacks Papers, supra note I9 (containing billing records that show orders for The
 Legal Process from various schools).
 96 We set forth our explication in greater detail in An Historical and Critical Introduction
 to The Legal Process, which will accompany our Foundation Press edition of The Legal Process.
 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
 THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
 forthcoming I994). See also Duxbury, supra note ii, at 670-703 (discussing the philosophies
 and contributions of legal process scholars like Wechsler, Bickel, Ely, Dworkin, and Wellington).
 97 See Memorandum [from Paul Freund, Henry Hart, and Lon Fuller] to Members of the
 Harvard Law School Faculty (Oct. 3, 1956), in Hart Papers, supra note I4, Box 35, Folder 7;
 Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, supra note
 14, at 3 (noting Dean Griswold's effort to bring H.L.A. Hart, Wechsler, and Stone to Harvard
 as visitors in order to stir jurisprudential debate).
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 government that is also lawlike and legitimate.98 In the wake of that
 remarkable seminar, several legal process classics emerged. Not only
 did Hart and Sacks's The Legal Process assume its final "tentative"
 form, but Hart published his Foreword, The Time Chart of the Jus-
 tices;99 Fuller published his reply to H.L.A. Hart's defense of positiv-
 ism;100 and Wechsler published Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
 tutional Law,101 an article generated by Wechsler's year as a visitor
 at Harvard.
 These authors were centrally concerned with the control of discre-
 tion - Hart and Sacks at the retail level of statutory and common
 law interpretation, Wechsler at the wholesale level of constitutional
 law, and Fuller at the meta-level of jurisprudence. They all believed
 that the control of discretion is necessary for a polity that operates
 under the rule of law. They designated the judiciary as the guardians
 of rule-of-law values and envisioned the duty of judges to be the
 "reasoned elaboration"102 of "neutral principles"103 and legislative
 "6purposes."104 These authors sharply contrasted such a rule-of-law
 polity with the alternatives - a return to Lochner-era jurocracy ac-
 cording to Wechsler, 105 the danger of "disintegrating resort to violence"
 for Hart and Sacks, 106 and the Nazi totalitarianism recalled by
 Fuller. 107
 These works, together with Hart and Wechsler's The Federal
 Courts108 and Fuller's Forms and Limits of Adjudication,109 comprise
 98 See, e.g., Memorandum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group (n.d.), in Hart Papers,
 supra note 14, Box 35, Folder 7 (announcing the next meeting for Nov. 20, 1956, and circulating
 Hart's paper, The Place of Discretion in the Legal System).
 99 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, I958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the
 Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959).
 100 Fuller's response reflected a toned-down version of his natural law position. See Lon L.
 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
 (1958) (responding to H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 7I HARV.
 L. REv. 593 (1958)).
 101 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv.
 I (1959). On the importance of Wechsler's year at Harvard to Wechsler, see Norman Silber &
 Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of
 Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 925-26 (I993).
 102 HART & SACKS, supra note i, at I62-71; see also Wechsler, supra note ioi, at I5
 ("reasoned explanation").
 103 Wechsler, supra note ioi, at i6; HART & SACKS, supra note i, at i65, 386-406, 1407-
 26 ("principles"); Hart, supra note 99, at 99 ("impersonal" principles).
 104 Fuller, supra note ioo, at 663; see also HART & SACKS, supra note i, at I66-67, 1178-
 1203, 1405-17.
 105 See Wechsler, supra note ioi, at 19-20, 23-24.
 106 HART & SACKS, supra note i, at 4-5.
 107 See Fuller, supra note ioo, at 657-6I, 671-72.
 108 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 59.
 109 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (I978).
 Fuller presented this as a draft in the I956-I957 discussion group but revised it and incorporated
 parts of it into articles for two decades. It was published after his death.
This content downloaded from 
             143.229.43.66 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 15:58:16 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 I994] THE LEGAL PROCESS 2049
 the canonic texts of what is now considered the legal process tradi-
 tion.110 Although The Legal Process was neither the most influential
 work in that corpus (that would be Hart and Wechsler's The Federal
 Courts), nor the most philosophically sophisticated (those would be
 Fuller's articles), nor even the most discussed (probably Wechsler's
 Neutral Principles), The Legal Process was the most comprehensive.
 It offered the most worked-through vision of our polity as a set of
 interlocking institutional relationships and set forth the freshest ideas
 and the tradition's classic vocabulary. The most influential public law
 scholars of the post-World War II generation utilized the vocabulary
 and built on the ideas.111
 B. The Rebel Generation
 The Legal Process seized the attention of so many law professors
 in the I950S and I96os because the materials summed up that gen-
 eration's vision of public law, which had crystallized just before World
 War II and had achieved consensus status after the war. Ironically,
 this vision achieved its classic expression at the very point when its
 intellectual foundation - the remarkable consensus between I938 and
 I959 - was evanescing.112 Although the legal process materials had
 little to say about constitutional issues, it is those issues that best
 revealed the limitations of legal process philosophy for the next gen-
 eration. 113
 The most riveting legal development of the I950S was the civil
 rights movement, which sought judicial and legislative measures to
 end racial apartheid. The prominence of civil rights on the nation's
 public law agenda unraveled the intellectual consensus achieved dur-
 ing World War II, and hence undermined important conceptual foun-
 dations of The Legal Process. The civil rights struggle also revealed
 the sinister possibilities of state power by revealing the state's authority
 110 See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the I950'S, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 56I, 566-67
 (1988).
 1"I We are specifically thinking of scholars such as Alexander Bickel, Robert Bork, Clark
 Byse, Abram Chayes, Kenneth Culp Davis, Reed Dickerson, Walter Gellhorn, Willard Hurst,
 Louis Jaffe, Louis Pollak, David Shapiro, and Harry Wellington.
 112 On this phenomenon in teaching materials generally, see Mark V. Tushnet, Metaproce-
 dure?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. i6i, I62-7I (I989).
 113 Norman Dorsen defends Hart and Sacks for ignoring the Warren Court's constitutional
 decisions on the ground that The Legal Process was a statutory rather than a constitutional law
 text. See Norman Dorsen, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, I05 HARV. L. REV. II, I3-I4
 (I99I). However, the I955 draft had a full chapter on constitutional law, and Hart and Sacks
 apparently intended to include such a chapter in the published product. Indeed, the failure to
 address constitutional law would be a shortcoming in a book designed to discuss "the legal
 process" in toto. Our view is that the Warren Court's sea change in constitutional law is one
 reason The Legal Process was not published in the I96os: the authors realized that much of the
 I958 edition would have to be rethought and not just "updated."
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 to exclude citizens from Hart's expanding pie. The Legal Process
 never mentioned Brown v. Board of Education and included no prob-
 lem dealing with judicial scrutiny of race discrimination. The omis-
 sion is ironic, for both authors had a deep interest in civil rights
 matters,114 and both defended Brown elsewhere.115 Legal process
 thinkers talked about democratic government as a set of intercon-
 nected institutions and, sometimes, as an integrated collection of pol-
 icies and principles. Yet, strikingly, these same thinkers, including
 those who mainly wrote about constitutional and legislative issues,
 seldom discussed elections, popular accountability of representatives,
 or equal participation of different groups.116
 These gaps and omissions reveal the thin theory of democracy
 under which legal process scholars operated. The principle of insti-
 tutional settlement suggested that legal process thinkers did not con-
 sider substantive fairness to be a primary element of political legiti-
 macy, and this suggestion amounted to an acquiescence in the status
 quo.117 That principle and such acquiescence were discordant with
 114 Albert and Sadelle Sacks both served on the Governor's Civil Rights Commission in
 Massachusetts and were active in civil rights work for their entire careers; the couple marched
 on Washington in I963 with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and were tear-gassed on Dupont Circle
 during a I967 protest against the War in Vietnam. Interview with Sadelle Sacks, in Belmont,
 Mass. (Aug. 2I, I993). Hart was also concretely committed to racial integration and was one
 of the few Harvard faculty of the period to send his child to integrated public schools, as Sadelle
 Sacks informed us. See id.; Letter from Elizabeth H. Miller to William N. Eskridge, Jr. (Feb.
 27, I994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
 115 See, e.g., Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, I953 Term - Foreword, 68 HARV. L.
 REV. 96, 96-99 (I954) (defending Brown as a great and principled decision); Letter from Henry
 M. Hart, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School, to Harry H. Wellington, Professor, Yale Law
 School, I (Dec. 3, I959), in Papers of Felix Frankfurter, Harvard Law School Library, Box
 I87, Folder 20 (praising "The Segregation Cases" and criticizing the Court for not striking down
 Virginia's anti-miscegenation law in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (I956)).
 We do not share the view of Professor Horwitz, see HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 266-68, 342
 n.I37, and Professor Peller, see Peller, supra note Iio, at 563-66, that Wechsler's questioning
 of Brown was representative of the legal process crowd, many of whom (like Hart and Sacks)
 went on record in defense of the decision. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court,
 i960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 50 (i96i); Charles Fairman,
 The Supreme Court, 1955 Term - Foreword: The Attack on the Segregation Cases, 70 HARV.
 L. REV. 83, 83 (I956); Paul Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 2I MOD. L.
 REV. 345, 349-5I (I958).
 116 Chapter IV of The Legal Process, in fewer than 50 pages, provided no more than a
 glimpse at direct democracy, the election of public officials, and reapportionment. For example,
 the chapter expresses doubts about the judicial capacity to force reapportionment, especially
 where a federal court order concerns a state legislature. See HART & SACKS, supra note i, at
 698-7I3. In "Note on the Relation Between the Voters' Choice and the Determination of Public
 Policy by the Legislature," see id. at 708-13, Hart and Sacks considered the responsiveness of
 elected officials to public preferences but did not concern themselves with whether discernible
 groups with demonstrably less power in the political process should receive any judicial protec-
 tion against legislation that disadvantages them.
 117 See Peller, supra note iio, at 6II-I7.
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 the experiences of women, people of color, gay men and lesbians,
 people living in poverty, and non-English-speaking immigrants, whose
 problems the "duly established mechanisms for change" did little to
 alleviate.118 This lack of interest in the dysfunctions of American
 democracy is all the more striking insofar as it represented a suppres-
 sion of themes being worked out on the eve of World War II, when
 both scholars and judges insisted that America's claim to be a working
 democracy required attention to race-based and other exclusions from
 equal citizenship.119
 Between I963 and I973, the socio-political conditions for the legal
 process synthesis ended.120 Not only was the ideological consensus
 exploded, but so too was Hart's notion of the expanding pie. After a
 generation of legal and economic binging, America rediscovered scar-
 city in the I970s, the decade of oil price shocks and stagflation.
 Likewise, our legal culture came to emphasize scarcity, and the con-
 cern with limited resources rendered controversies that involved civil
 rights and fair resource allocation even more intense. For these and
 other reasons, a new generation found the optimistic legal process
 baselines "out of touch with reality."'121 Hart and Sacks's synthesis
 was rejected by some of their most thoughtful students, from both
 the right (Richard Posner's law and economics movement) and the left
 (the critical legal studies movement founded by Morton Horwitz,
 Duncan Kennedy, Mark Tushnet, and Roberto Unger). 122 In the more
 cynical, conflictual world of the I970s, the halls of Harvard Law
 School during Sacks's tenure as dean echoed with faculty announce-
 ments that "legal process is dead."
 118 See generally DONALD W. CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA 38-56, 28I-92 (I95I)
 (discussing the legal prohibitions and penalties faced by gay men and lesbians); BETTY FRIEDAN,
 THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE passim (I963) (discussing how social forces prevented women from
 participating in economic and political life); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE
 NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 523-69 (I944) (describing the American justice
 system as a source of humiliation and oppression for African-American citizens).
 119 See PURCELL, supra note ii, at I97-2I7; Bixby, supra note II, at 762-79 (outlining the
 philosophical and social views of Justices Stone, Frankfurter, Murphy, Black, Douglas, Roberts,
 Rutledge, and Reed).
 120 See generally GODFREY HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME I53-273 (I976) (describing
 the breakdown of American social consensus wrought by Vietnam and worsening race relations);
 SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, A Concept and Its History: The End of Ideology, in CONSENSUS AND
 CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 8i, 87-98 (I985) (describing the intellectual reaction
 against the "decline in ideology" posited by some in the I950S and I960s); LESTER C. THUROW,
 THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 5-6
 (I980) (noting the relative economic decline of the United States during the early I970s).
 121 Mensch, supra note 2, at 30.
 122 Posner and Unger were students in Harvard's elective, "The Legal Process." Kennedy
 and Tushnet read The Legal Process while at Yale Law School and have both taught the subject,
 Kennedy from Hart and Sacks's materials and Tushnet from his own update of the old Garrison
 and Hurst materials. See Mark V. Tushnet, Government Processes (I992) (unpublished teaching
 materials, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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 C. "New" Legal Process: A Fresh Generation of Centrists
 Like Mark Twain, The Legal Process has enjoyed a flourishing
 afterlife. The materials have been cited and (usually) discussed in
 more than three hundred law review articles and notes since i982123
 and have molded and influenced significant public law scholars of the
 period. Some scholars, such as Harry Wellington, David Shapiro,
 and Reed Dickerson, were rough contemporaries of Hart or Sacks
 and carried on the Hart and Sacks project in their chosen areas of
 constitutional law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation,
 respectively. 124 Others were students in Hart's "Legislation" class or
 "The Legal Process" class and applied the core ideas of those classes
 in new ways to issues of administrative law (Stephen Breyer, Richard
 Stewart), constitutional law (Abram Chayes, Owen Fiss, Frank Mich-
 elman), and statutory interpretation (Richard Posner).125 Others did
 not take the class but absorbed the legal process agenda and vocab-
 ulary by osmosis and applied it toward ambitious rethinkings of the
 Constitution (John Hart Ely), statutes (Guido Calabresi), and juris-
 prudence (Ronald Dworkin).126 Still others read The Legal Process
 after it had ceased to be taught at their law schools; this generation
 of "new legal process" academics127 has been inspired by Hart and
 Sacks to rejuvenate statutory interpretation as a central area of intel-
 lectual inquiry. 128
 123 Search of LEXIS, Law Rev library (Spring I993).
 124 See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
 I37-64 (I975); J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES passim (I982); ROBERT KEETON,
 VENTURING To Do JUSTICE at v-vi (I967); SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
 9I-I35 (I973); David Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
 of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 929-42 (I965); Harry H. Wellington, Common
 Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
 22I, 222-25 (1973).
 125 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 346-68 (I982); RICHARD A.
 POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (I985); Abram Chayes, The Role
 of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. I28I, I307-I6 (I976); Owen M. Fiss,
 The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. I, 5-
 I7, 33-35, 44-58 (I979); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
 88 HARV. L. REv. I667, I760-I802 (I975).
 126 Professor Ely testified to this fact in a conversation with William Eskridge, Interview
 with Professor John H. Ely, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 30, I993); Dean Calabresi has indicated
 his debt to Hart and the legal process school in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
 AGE OF STATUTES 87-90 (I982); and Professor Dworkin has been pinned with a substantial
 debt in Vincent Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart &
 Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 4I3, 4I6-28 (I987).
 127 Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process,
 35 STAN. L. REv. 2I3, 239-49 (I983); see Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal
 Process, 77 CAL. L. REv. 919, 9I9-20 (I989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP
 P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (I988)).
 128 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv.
 20, 24-32 (I988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, I35 U. PA. L.
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 As long as American government is procedurally complex, involves
 interacting institutions, and affects our lives pervasively, The Legal
 Process will remain instructive. Hart and Sacks's "Case of the Spoiled
 Cantaloupes,"1129 in which the court held Joseph Martinelli & Co.
 liable in damages for rejecting a state-certified shipment of cantaloupes
 Martinelli found to be spoiled, can be analyzed simply as a miscarriage
 of justice, especially from Martinelli's perspective. But Hart and
 Sacks insisted that the student consider the case from other perspec-
 tives as well. The rules of state certification served the useful purpose
 of facilitating the operation of the market for fresh fruit by assuring
 the seller that its goods would be paid for. The value of such a rule,
 Hart and Sacks suggested, might exceed the costs of its occasional
 harsh application. If so, the court was right and Martinelli was
 wrong. Although the government no longer regulates fresh canta-
 loupes in this way, Hart and Sacks's problem is a sophisticated intro-
 duction to the complex issues arising out of the interaction of state
 policies, administrative procedures, and private responses. The prob-
 lem is also jurisprudentially instructive. On the one hand, it insists
 upon the law's capacity to serve as a focal point for human interac-
 tions and thereby "to counter the tendency for drift or inertia to
 predominate often in shaping affairs."1130 On the other hand, it is an
 occasion to recall that state regulations might not work any better
 than the dysfunctional private markets they displace.
 Viewed with critical distance, the legal process philosophy is, in
 some respects, even more productive today than it was in the 1950s.
 For example, new positive theories of political institutions are finding
 their way into public law scholarship.131 These theories not only
 suggest more sophisticated ways of thinking about the differing com-
 petencies of institutions and about the dynamics of their relationships
 - in other words, a more sophisticated Hart-and-Sacks analysis -
 but they have also introduced Hart and Sacks to a new audience of
 political scientists and allied law professors. These theorists view Hart
 and Sacks as an attractive normative countervision to the law-as-deals
 REV. 1479, 1544-49 (I987); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
 Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 250-51
 (I986); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
 369, 408-II (I989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
 L. REV. 405, 434-37 (I989).
 129 HART & SACKS, supra note i, at 10-75.
 130 Letter from J. Willard Hurst, Professor, Wisconsin
 Law School, to William N. Eskridge, Jr. (Sept. 21, 1993) (on file with the Harvard Law School
 Library).
 131 See Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 8o GEO. L.J. 457 (1992);
 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 8o
 GEO. L.J. 457 passim (1992).
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 or law-as-text vision that now prevails on the Supreme Court. 132
 Indeed, this is an enduring value of The Legal Process, especially its
 chapter on statutory interpretation, which remains the best teaching
 material on the topic. Hart and Sacks's optimistic vision of citizens
 as interdependent and law as purposive has a continuing and perhaps
 growing audience for a society roasting in a cynical bonfire of the
 vanities.
 Although the civil rights movement undermined the cogency of the
 legal process agenda in the I96os, the renaissance of legal process
 thinking may indeed be facilitated by America's explicit multicultur-
 alism. Values and assumptions in law are more contested today than
 they were in the 195os. But at some point, there is pressure either to
 settle points of contention or to reach a peaceful accommodation
 among the contested views. In short, after periods of sharp ideological
 disagreement, centrism - a moderation that seeks change without
 disruption, accommodation without great cost - tends to make a
 comeback in American public law. As Norman Dorsen wrote in his
 memorial tribute to both Al Sacks, the friend and mentor, and The
 Legal Process, the teaching materials, "[d]espite continuing divisions
 within society, a more realistic assessment of prospects for fundamen-
 tal change makes incremental reform more appealing these days. "133
 And Hart and Sacks staked out useful strategies for centrism, based
 upon dialogue among diverse points of view, deferral of issues until
 agreement can be reached, deliberation and openness to new facts and
 points of view, a search for common ground, and a willingness to
 approach issues from a different angle and to devise structures for
 working out disagreements.134
 If legal process - old or new - is to make a solid contribution
 to American public law in the next generation, however, it must
 develop satisfactory responses to the main challenges posed in the
 1970s: If law is a policy science, must law professors not provide more
 than a casual armchair analysis of substantive issues? If citizens are
 interdependent and the state necessarily purposive, does law's legiti-
 macy not depend upon the state's capacity to serve the interests of all
 132 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of
 Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 265, 273-78 (Nomos XXXVI, I994).
 133 Dorsen, supra note II3, at I3.
 134 For examples of modern centrist scholarship in the direction suggested by Hart and
 Sacks, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, I985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-
 Government, ioo HARV. L. REV. 4 passim (I986); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, I986
 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, ioi HARV. L. REv. IO passim (I987); and Margaret J.
 Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. I699 passim (I990).
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 its citizens? If institutions are central to law's unfolding, is it not our
 responsibility to develop theories of comparative institutional legiti-
 macy and efficacy? Hart and Sacks posed good questions. Their
 would-be heirs in the I99OS face the challenge of answering those
 questions as well as the new ones posed by the critics of the legal
 process.
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